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Abstract
In the present context of intensifying competition between the major trading economies and potentially game-changing tech-
nological developments, the European Union is generally seen as the weaker party. Lacking the ‘hard power’ derived from mil-
itary capabilities, it has laid claim to a ‘soft power’ of normative influence externally, yet even that is only partially utilised. Nor
has Europe been able to exercise the power to coerce – ‘sharp power’ – commensurate with its economic weight as a trading
bloc equivalent in size and reach to the US or China, its most prominent global competitors. How can Europe strengthen its
position, and in what fields? Through a scenario exercise, we develop eight policy proposals aimed at countering Europe´s vul-
nerabilities and enabling it to assert its sharp and soft power more effectively. Specifically, we consider the feasibility, means
and scope for their realisation. Together, they provide a transformative agenda for the EU’s position in the world.
The challenge
In an increasingly turbulent world, characterised by intensi-
fying competition between the major trading economies
and potentially game-changing technological developments,
Europe is generally seen as the weaker party. In a sporting
metaphor, it ‘punches beneath its weight’ and fails, too
often, to utilise the power it ought to have as an economy
of roughly equal size to the US and China. Lacking the ‘hard
power’ derived from military capabilities, it has laid claim to
a ‘soft power’ of normative influence externally, albeit with
questionable success. Europe has also been unable to
impose its will globally, compared with the US and China,
its most prominent global competitors, despite having an
equivalent economic weight as a trading bloc. Instead, it
has left itself vulnerable to secondary sanctions, especially
from the US, and appears to be losing influence to China’s
Belt and Road Initiative. This is in a broader context of the
EU lacking an effective strategic overview of its interests vis-
a-vis other regions and states.
This paper assesses the EU’s vulnerabilities, as well as its
potential leverage, in relation to the external world. It exami-
nes whether a transformation in Europe’s deployment of
power can be achieved by 2030. A ‘back-casting’ approach
to exploring these matters was adopted, a version of fore-
sight methodologies (Van der Heijden, 2005; Wilkinson and
Kupers, 2014), in which the goal for 2030 is defined and the
pathway to attaining it from today’s starting-point is investi-
gated.
The notion of power is critical. Using the dichotomy
developed by Nye (2004), the US has epitomised ‘hard
power’ through the strength and reach of its military. As
championed by Europe ‘soft power’, is the ability to project
values and norms on to the global stage, without relying on
force or coercion. Soft power is based on attraction, created
by a country’s policies and political ideas. More recently the
notion of ‘sharp power’ has come to the fore (Walker and
Ludwig, 2017). Originally thought of as the means by which
authoritarian governments seek to impose themselves on
the democratic institutions of others, ‘sharp power’ can
arguably also be thought of as the use of coercion (but
stopping short of violence), to persuade other countries to
follow a desired path. The ability to coerce, for example by
imposing sanctions others are obliged to follow, can be
associated with ‘market’ power (Damro, 2012).
Approach
We envisioned a preferred outcome scenario with Europe as
a self-confident and united market power offering, a demo-
cratic and socially inclusive alternative globally. As part of
the back-casting approach, we asked what measures would
be needed to make Europe a champion of economic growth
with high-quality employment, open trade with equitable
access for those outside the single market or customs union,
and a rule-based order with norm-setting ambitions,
enhancing and further developing today’s multilateral order.
How can Europe realise this vision? What are the strong
and weak signals that point to developments in one direc-
tion or another?1 Which constraints are to be overcome,
what capacities need building and expanding, what reforms
are needed, and what stands to Europe’s advantage? How
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can Europe exploit its advantages and overcome obstacles
in realising this vision, given persistent difficulties, even
open conflicts and failures, to reconcile profound tensions in
key fields? These include:
• managing migration challenges, for example, moral ambi-
guity of outsourcing migration management to Turkey;
• technological, for example, Europe struggling to keep up
with technological giants like Google, and China making
huge advances in robotics;
• economic, for example, procrastination in solving long-
standing problems in the Eurozone;
• military/security, for example, most EU countries not
meeting NATO spending targets, and lack of coordination
among European armies;
• political, for example, Europe’s self-proclaimed under-
standing of itself as a democracy, but tolerating illiberal
and populist tendencies internally;
• ecological, for example, outspoken commitment to the
Paris Agreement, but falling behind in meeting agreed-
upon targets; and
• values, for example, the Copenhagen criteria
2 and com-
mitment to inclusive societies challenged by resurgence
of nationalist values and identity politics.
We made several assumptions to allow us to focus on the
main question of how Europe could realise the vision of a
self-confident and united market power offering a demo-
cratic and socially equitable alternative globally:
• The polycentric world will remain for the relevant time
frame, with the US, China and Europe as the main cen-
tres. While seeking to expand their respective spheres of
influence, there will be increased competition between all
three.
• In the face of increased external threats and tensions,
European integration will either lead to some reconfigura-
tion, differentiated integration or simply ‘muddling
through’. The European Union, however, will not break
up, notwithstanding the United Kingdom´s withdrawal.
• Major military conflicts are unlikely, but not impossible;
the nature of conflict will change profoundly, with less
20th century state-on-state conflicts, but increased hybrid
warfare.3
• Domestically, socio-political tensions within countries will
rise, democratic systems might come under pressure and
political consensus harder to reach.
• Migration will continue, even intensify, but there will be
no new massive influx of migrants into Europe, such as
seen at the height of the Syrian Civil War in 2015.
While many policy fields come into focus for the back-
casting scenario, we selected three because they are directly
related to the EU sharp and soft power. These policy areas
are likely to become highly relevant in the context of the
next phase of globalisation. From the late 19th century until
the First World War, and again from mid to late 20th cen-
tury, globalisation was about what countries could produce
best (in terms of end products). More recently, the focus
shifted from end products to the intermediary steps of glo-
bal value chains and ‘functions’ (software, marketing, design,
etc.), a shift termed ‘globalisation 2.0’. As analysed by Bald-
win (2016), the combination of widely diffused technologies
and low wages has favoured certain emerging countries,
often at the expense of mature economies, engendering
convergence, in contrast to the divergence of the prior
globalisation phase. The increasing reliance of Europe on
diverse service industries is one consequence and it pre-
sents countries with unprecedented policy challenges in
their efforts to maintain reliable growth and social cohesion.
Importantly, such policy fields involve critical decisions,
and are indicative of the EU’s under-utilisation relative to
the United States and China:4
• Trade and investment – a policy field of critical impor-
tance given heightened tensions.
• Creation and control of knowledge – a field of growing
significance but which is also highly contested.
• Ownership and Regulation of data – a field that epito-
mises fundamental differences in underlying values,
objectives and approaches.
The scenario exercise had four stages. In the first, we pre-
pared background documents and questions covering the
policy fields above. The second stage was a workshop bring-
ing together a group of distinguished experts in these fields
to explore areas in which Europe had the potential to boost
its use of soft or sharp power. These experts, twenty-two in
all, included academics and ‘think-tankers’, officials from EU
institutions, and specialists from business and the media.
We then refined the outputs from their deliberation – which
had been mediated by scenario facilitators – into ten policy
proposals. These were then subjected to validation, in a
third stage, by a group of experts (twenty participants,
mainly drawn from think tanks and the policy world) con-
vened in Washington, thereby providing a US input, and by
questionnaires sent to both Asian and US-based specialists
in the policy fields covered, eliciting twenty responses. A
fourth phase involved a major revision leading to the eight
proposals presented in this paper.
Eight measures
Some of the measures we identified are mainly at the sharp
power end of the spectrum, while others are squarely in the
European tradition of soft power. They are, starting with
those at the sharper end and finishing with the softer:
• Internationalisation of the euro.
• Expanding the EU’s capacity to impose trade sanctions.
• Building on GDPR to establish a data ratings agency,
making Europe the global leader in data protection.
• Promotion of new technologies through targeted invest-
ment and ‘smart’ clustering.
• A modernised competition policy to reflect strategic Euro-
pean objectives.
• Developing a ‘digital silk road’ to amplify connections
with neighbouring countries.
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• Strategic extension of the Erasmus scheme.
• Furthering the global role of European values and cultural
assets.
The prospects of the eight areas are summarised in
Table 1 and presented in more detail below. A concluding
section identifies lessons for how to proceed, again drawing
on insights from the validation exercises.
Internationalisation of the Euro
Proposal
To accelerate the internationalisation of the euro, including
by raising its share of usage by other countries as a global
reserve currency, and fostering more extensive use of the
currency for invoicing and as a unit for transactions.
Rationale
Despite being a relative newcomer, the euro already has a
substantial international role as a reserve currency, but it
lags a long way behind the US dollar in this regard. The
share of the euro in global official reserve holdings has hov-
ered around the 20 per cent mark for many years, just edg-
ing upwards in 2018. But the dollar share, though slipping
slightly, is still over 60 per cent, and it remains the main
reserve currency (European Central Bank, 2019). In other
respects, too, the dollar far outweighs not just the euro, but
all other currencies. The dollar is by far the preferred unit
for transactions, with only negligible proportions of trade
not directly involving the EU invoiced in euros. Even for EU
exports to the rest of the world, the US Dollar is the cur-
rency mostly used: 45.4 per cent of trade is invoiced in US
Dollars, compared to 41.4 per cent in euro (Eurostat, 2019).
For Europe to achieve greater sharp power, a move to bol-
ster the euro as a leading reserve currency would greatly
enhance its economic standing and influence.
Measures
In the early years of the euro, an international role for the
euro neither commanded comprehensive support nor
appeared realistic. There is now evidence of a willingness to
overturn this previous ambivalence, with the European Com-
mission (2018a, 2018b) setting out potential initiatives, sup-
ported by analytic policy briefs (for example, Montoya and
Buti, 2019). Achieving further reform of the architecture of
European economic and monetary union is essential. Key
requirements will include completing the banking union,
significant progress on advancing the EU capital markets
union and the establishment of a European safe asset.
Although markets will, ultimately, determine usage of the
euro for transactions, the EU can use its market power to
develop a strategy to reduce the share of dollar invoicing in
key sectors, such as energy. To avoid or reduce the impact
of retaliation, the SWIFT financial messaging service should
be shielded from US influence by pushing for its political
neutrality, that is, through an agreement between IMF mem-
bers that guarantees its independence (Geranmayeh and
Rapnouil, 2019).
Conditions
To be credible in an international role, a currency needs to
be underpinned by an effective central bank, able and will-
ing to undertake the day-to-day management of flows of
money. But while the ECB has manifestly enlarged its role
since the years of crisis, it has to respect both the treaty
and member state political constraints. In addition, the EU
would have to overcome perceptions among financial actors
of three sorts of barriers identified by the ECB: an inability
to provide stability both domestically and internationally;
the limited depth and liquidity of euro area financial mar-
kets; and Europe not speaking with one voice on interna-
tional matters. Lack of coherence is not confined to financial
matters, manifesting itself also in security and foreign policy.
Feasibility
While reforms of the Eurozone can help to internationalise
the euro, there are far from negligible external hurdles to
overcome. Given its propensity to use the dollar as a coer-
cive foreign policy measure, the US is likely to resist the
development of other reserve currencies and will want to
sustain the dollar’s fundamental role in global financial mar-
kets and payment systems. Growing acceptance of the need
for a euro safe asset (perhaps along the lines of the ‘purple’
bond suggested by Bini Smaghi and Marcussen, 2019; or
one of the proposals examined by Leandro and Zettelmeyer,
2019) suggests this will become a reality soon.
A clear message from experts in the US was that a step-
change in the role of the euro remains unlikely. At the same
time, China has recently sought to promote the internation-
alisation of the renminbi and, though starting from a low
base, can be expected to compete with the EU to boost its
currency’s international role. Nor does the US face direct
pressure to diminish the global role of the dollar – in con-
trast to early post-war years when the UK had little choice
about curtailing the use of sterling as a global currency –
and must therefore be expected to resist incursions from
the EU and China.
Benefits
These will be both economic and political. For Europe, as an
economy with a comparable economic weight to the US in
the global system, harnessing some of the dollar’s advan-
tages has long seemed a desirable goal, capable of bolster-
ing internal monetary sovereignty and lowering borrowing
costs though reduced political risk. This would be comple-
mented by reducing the exposure of European financial
intermediaries to US ‘weaponisation’ of the dollar (Fleming,
2019). Increased international leverage of the EU via the
euro creates increased ‘sharp power’ for Europe to pursue
its long-term interests. This would come from drawing third
countries more into its sphere of influence and from giving
a credible alternative to what some see as the ‘TINA’ (there
is no alternative) nature of holding reserves in dollars via T-
bonds, irrespective of risks and rewards. In this regard,
voices in the US have argued recently that an increased role
for the euro as a reserve currency would also benefit inves-
tors across the world, including in the US. Although the
© 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2020) 11:1
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Table 1. Summary of eight proposals to enhance European sharp and soft power
Proposal Rationale Measures to enable it Conditions to meet Feasibility Benefits for EU power
International-
isation of the
euro
Challenge to US$ ‘privilege’;
greater monetary sovereignty
Completion of EMU,
especially banking
union; need for euro
safe asset; capital
markets union
Concerns about expanding
role of ECB beyond what
member states can accept;
market scepticism
Slow progress possible;
creates some obligations;
challenge from China
Boost use of the euro as reserve
currency and unit for invoicing
A more
assertive use
of external
trade
sanctions
EU is under-utilizing its sanctions
options; it also needs to
strengthen its capacity to resist
secondary sanctions
Empower Commission
in coordination and
monitoring; exploit EU
vote share at IMF
Overcome constraint of need
for Council unanimity; to
shift from reactiveness
towards the US to a more
proactive stance
Rests on political will to
develop a geostrategic
vision; need to revise its
own governance, take
parallel measures
Protect and project the EU’s
trading interests; stronger sense
of identity and purpose geo-
strategically; reduce vulnerability
to secondary sanctions
Data rating
agency: GDPR
with teeth
Further developing GDPR and
raising citizen awareness of
down-side of inadequate data
protection standards; curbing
corporate control of data
Creating a data rating
agency, comparable to
credit rating agencies
Coping with backlash from
multi-national corporations
Providing funding
Demanding, given likely
backlash from global
actors subject to rating
Projecting standard- and norm-
setting power globally
Smart
clustering
innovation
Overcoming lack of scale and
scope for bringing innovations to
market
Proactive identification
of investment and
market-making
opportunities
Political willingness
Streamlining policies and
measures
Demanding, given,
national interests and
institutional inertia
Becoming the world leader in new
and growing markets in highly
innovative fields
Modernised
competition
policy
Reconciling pro-competitive and
strategic dimensions of industrial
policy; achieving greater market
power
Facilitating EU
champions in globally
significant industries
and emerging
technologies
Definition of boundaries; risk
of favouring insiders; how
to enforce; poor track
record of public sector in
‘picking-winners’
Trade rules restrictions; few
direct costs
Enabling emergence of global
leaders in new technologies;
market power
Digital
development
initiative
Counter-initiative to Chinese
digital silk road
Combination of public
and private funding
Legal frameworks to
stimulate investments
Own digital infrastructure
has to be developed first
Additional funding needed
Difficult to achieve rapidly,
considering current
efforts
Large financing gap
Increasing EU’s soft and sharp
power through standard setting
and containment of Chinese
influence
Erasmus
Global
Building on the success of
ERASMUS and ERASMUS+ to
attract highly qualified talent and
build alumni pool; Erasmus
Global as a strategic tool
Relevant streams and
themes; opening up to
new countries;
creating and
managing alumni
network
Significant new resources;
address shortcomings in
university networks in
Europe; overcome
institutional barriers
Sensitivities in intruding on
to existing national
spaces; intelligence-use
Soft-power cultural influence;
enhance human capital in Europe
Culture Europe No EU agency fit for purpose to
promote European values and
realize cultural assets
Arms-length institution
answerable to
European Parliament
Subsidiarity with national
agencies
Relatively easy Europe as a coherent soft power
with convincing narrative
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euro will remain the second international currency, it has a
reasonable prospect of slowly eroding dollar dominance,
but there should be no illusions: it will still lag behind by
2030. Even those in Brussels in favour of the idea acknowl-
edge the difficulty of securing the internal consensus essen-
tial to making progress.
Trade sanctions reform
Proposal
To deploy trade sanctions more effectively in order to serve
the EU’s strategic international interests.
Rationale
As an economy of comparable size, the EU has a strong
interest in being able to act independently, and to avoid
being subject to obligations to conform to sanctions
imposed by others when it rejects the underlying premise.
China has increasingly used coercive economic measures,
such as restricting trade and encouraging popular boycotts,
to punish countries that undermine its territorial claims or
foreign policy goals (Harrell et al., 2018). Leveraging the
power of the dollar and its market power, US sanctions are
highly effective. As seen in the case of the Iran sanctions
after US withdrawal from the JCPOA, US sanctions have dri-
ven EU companies out of Iran after being threatened with
penalties or loss of access to the US market (Geranmayeh
and Rapnouil, 2019).
Unlike China and the US, Europe is underutilising its
potential arsenal of sanctions. While the EU currently has
more than 3,500 sanctions against entities or persons in
over 30 countries in place (Council of the European Union,
2019, with own calculations), there is little indication of an
overall strategy; rather, except for a focus on terrorism pre-
vention, they seem more like ad hoc actions.
Measures
To foster a common European sanctions regime, member
states should authorise the Commission to improve national
coordination of sanctions enforcement. Various means of
empowering the Commission to act in this area, on behalf
of member states, are essential pre-conditions to realising
the EU’s leverage.
At the international level, the EU can exploit its voting
share within the IMF (29.6 per cent) much more effectively,
and especially when considering the comparatively much
smaller US voting power of 16.5 per cent. A relevant case is
the EU’s response to the threat of secondary sanctions from
the US. The latter threatened to disconnect European firms
from the SWIFT financial messaging service, as was done
with Iranian banks. The EU could push for an agreement
between IMF members to keep SWIFT as an independent
and politically neutral financial messaging service that can-
not be subject to unilateral measures, except for UNSC sanc-
tions.
Similarly, there is an opportunity to build on the coopera-
tion between the EU and China in trying to improve the
functioning of the World Trade Organisation, and thereby
strengthen the global sanctions regime. A recent proposal
(along with India, Canada and a number of other countries)
to resolve the impasse over dispute settlement caused by
the US blocking of appointments to the WTO’s Appellate
Body is an example of how robust American use of power
can be countered.
Conditions
A major barrier to more effective resort to sanctions to
improve sharp power is discord among EU member states.
As they are responsible for the enforcement of sanctions,
the Commission is restricted to monitoring and supervisory
tasks.
Another important barrier is the EU’s asymmetric interde-
pendence with the US. The EU mostly uses sanctions in
cooperation with the US (Biersteker and Portela, 2015),
which can incentivise third countries to privilege their direct
negotiations with Washington rather than the EU, yet the
US has repeatedly demonstrated no qualms about acting
unilaterally.
Feasibility
Realising its full trade leverage will be a major challenge for
the EU. It rests on the development by the EU of a stronger
political will to act in concert. This presupposes much: a
shift away from the unanimity rule in the Council; the
greater empowerment of the Commission (to monitor, to
act); and, more generally, the EU acquiring for itself a stron-
ger geostrategic vision. Even then, its leverage is likely to be
dependent on parallel measures (notably, the euro as a
reserve currency – see above). Whether these conditions
can be met is a great ‘known unknown’ – requiring self-re-
flection and resolve.
Perhaps not surprisingly, there was much scepticism
from our US and Asian experts as to the feasibility of the
EU exercising ‘sharp power’ via trade sanctions, since the
EU has hitherto been mostly reactive. Some US experts
questioned whether the EU could realise the capability to
act like Washington or Beijing in this regard – it is not a
single state actor, unlike them, nor can it deploy similar
military (hard power) threats. Moreover, its leverage would
probably depend on the euro becoming a more heavily
used reserve currency. Asian experts similarly doubted the
EU’s capacity to act, while also highlighting that the effec-
tiveness of sanctions can often be undermined by their
circumvention via trade loop-holes. Feedback from EU offi-
cials included concerns about how recent trends in certain
national democracies might undermine the EU’s moral
authority.
Benefits
Exerting leverage via the effective deployment of trade
sanctions can protect and project the EU’s trading interests
in an unstable international environment, while also under-
pinning the values Europe seeks to advance globally. It
would oblige Europe to reconsider the balance between
reactive (defensive) or proactive measures in the context of
a currently fragile multilateralism.
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More generally, it can foster a greater sense of its own
geostrategic interests and vision, more so if it facilitates
cooperation with other like-minded powers. The latter can
produce benefits both within the member states and exter-
nally – establishing a stronger sense of identity and pur-
pose. Equally, it would need to sustain that independence
of view in the face of possible counter-threats from rival
powers, who may be intent on pursuing ‘divide-and-rule’
tactics.
Sharpening GDPR’s teeth: establishing a data rating
agency
Proposal
To create a European data rating agency with a mandate,
and the capacity, to evaluate and assess privacy standards
of algorithms and software. This feeds into the narrative of
the EU as global champion of privacy protection, which
enhances European soft power. But the proposal would also
enhance its sharp power through the enforcement of pri-
vacy standards, thereby pushing other countries and global
actors to comply.
Rationale
In May 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
entered into force. It establishes a common set of data pro-
tection rules for all companies operating in the EU, regard-
less of their origin. It has the potential to become a
foundation on which the EU can build to establish global
standards for, among other objectives, citizens’ rights to pri-
vacy and control of data.
In a recent Special Eurobarometer survey, only one in five
Europeans said that they are always informed about the
conditions attached to the collection and use of their per-
sonal data online (European Commission, 2019b). Forty
three per cent have never changed their privacy settings on
an online social network because they trusted the platform
(European Commission, 2019c). This trust, however, might
be misguided. In 2018 alone, the collection and use of data
has been at the centre of many corporate scandals: from
Cambridge Analytica’s efforts to exploit data in an effort to
personalize campaigning measures to ‘bugs’ in Google’s
social network, giving third-party apps access to private data
from at least 500,000 people (Cyphers and Gebhart, 2018).
Several major corporations have had their data security
breached, putting customers’ identity data at risk. Citizens
should therefore be wary of trusting companies to handle
their data responsibly and ensure privacy at all times.
Easing the identification of privacy levels attached to pro-
grammes and services helps citizens to understand how
cautiously their data are processed – beyond the standards
set by the GDPR. This could be realised by a privacy rating
issued by a data rating agency, perhaps comparable to
credit rating agencies.
The GDPR is already a compelling example of how Europe
is utilising its market power and setting global standards on
data protection and privacy. Other countries, such as Japan,
had to set up specialised agencies to comply with these
new standards (Scott and Cerulus, 2018). GDPR is also being
felt by tech giants, as users have filed an increasing number
of complaints with, for example, the Irish Data Protection
Commission – up to 56 per cent more compared to pre-
GDPR times (Lomas, 2019). Establishing an agency that rates
privacy levels beyond GDPR standards is an elegant way to
further these standards and extend Europe’s influence. What
the US is for credit ratings, Europe can become for privacy.
Measures
A rating agency charged with the assessment of privacy and
data protection of software and algorithms used by corpora-
tions needs to be created. The assessment should result in
an easy-to-understand rating that allows users to under-
stand the privacy risks associated with the respective digital
services. It would also ease enforcement by national authori-
ties, as frequent user complaints combined with a low rating
could trigger fines and demands for improvement.
Conditions
Business models of many companies today are based on
the collection and processing of their users’ data. These
companies are likely to oppose any efforts to establish an
agency that evaluates the privacy level of their software and
algorithms. Successfully dealing with this opposition is a cru-
cial condition that has to be met.
Another condition concerns funding: a new organisation
will need financial resources to set up operations and sus-
tain them. Extending the parallel with credit ratings agen-
cies, an obvious option is to charge data holders.
Coordination with data protection authorities will also be
necessary, as these authorities are the main points of con-
tact for citizens who seek advice on data protection issues.
Feasibility
Setting up the agency will require the EU to be forceful in
making demands on other global actors, perhaps (in extre-
mis) by threatening curbs on access to EU markets – which
is fundamentally a continuation of efforts started with the
GDPR. Given their substantial stakes in digital service indus-
tries, resistance especially from China and the US is to be
expected. Both might well retaliate by restricting market
access for EU companies. Affected companies might pres-
sure their governments to withdraw support for the agency.
Yet, similar problems were solved when the GDPR was ini-
tially rolled out. There will, too, be a need to emphasise the
benefits to EU citizens and to explain to people in other
countries why data protection matters. However, since pri-
vacy-related corporate scandals are legion nowadays, this
will not be a particularly complex endeavour.
Benefits
Developing this capacity would enable the EU to defend and
project its standards in the global economy, enabling it to be
influential by being ahead of the proverbial standard setting
curve, and thereby to shape both market developments and
consumer protection. Thus, the EU would increase effective
enforcement of its standard and norm-setting ambitions,
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giving the bloc a stronger grasp over technology-related
aspects of human rights, especially privacy. The EU can estab-
lish itself as a leading actor in the field of data ownership and
regulation, in contrast to competing models such as the
surveillance capitalism commonly found in the US. This is also
attractive to others: affiliating yourselves to the (new) shining
city upon the hill has been, and will be, a substantial source of
soft power for many countries.
Additionally, as companies are interested in receiving the
top rating, it would be reasonable to expect overall privacy
standards to be raised.
Smart clustering and market-making
Proposal
To foster competitive technology companies of high market
potential through smart clustering around strategic invest-
ments in innovations and value chains.
Rationale
Europe is not taking full advantage of the many opportuni-
ties spawned by the developments of new technologies.
Despite growing investments in research and training, and
despite a higher concentration of relevant PhDs than the
US, innovation clusters, be they in France, Italy, Poland or
other member states, are mostly neither of the scope nor
scale to compete globally. What is more, China has become
active in buying up know-how by purchasing European
companies outright, especially in AI. Since 2008, Chinese pri-
vate and state-backed companies have engaged in deals
worth more than $255bn, taking over at least 360 compa-
nies (Tartar et al., 2018). Available venture capital funding
has long been inadequate to support European tech compa-
nies; moreover, it slipped slightly in 2018 and is now just
over one-fifth of the US figure. But the challenge goes
beyond investments alone. It requires a different approach.
Unfortunately, national innovation systems and industrial
and regional policies remain too focused on member states
internally, leaving their pan-EU potential widely unrealised.
While biotechnology is strong in several important hubs,
notably Berlin, Munich, Cambridge, and while the ‘BioValley’
in Germany, France, and Switzerland constitutes a successful
cross-border development (European Union, 2019), they are
hardly a competitor for US clusters (Terry, 2016). Likewise,
London, Paris and Berlin are the AI capitals of Europe (Allott
et al., 2018), strengthened by their talented workforce and a
network of universities. Yet despite their national promi-
nence, they lag far behind San Francisco, New York, Beijing
and Shanghai in AI investments (Netimperative, 2018).
Measures
Europe needs to engage in proactive market-making to help
companies in the new technologies collectively gain suffi-
cient scale and scope. Such an innovation and economic
policy would target regions and cities, across Europe,
actively searching for emerging and potential market oppor-
tunities. It entails identifying innovations and seeking to link
their potentials with a view to creating value chains across
clusters and across member states. These clusters can either
complement each other, thereby adding scope, or
strengthen existing capacities, to boost scale. Specifically:
• Encourage public bodies in potential clusters to submit
proposals for InvestEU funds and consider ear-marking a
proportion of the €650bn proposed for the 2021–27 per-
iod for this purpose. A policy of smart clustering and mar-
ket-making should be implemented in priority fields such
as sustainable infrastructure, AI, biotechnology and digi-
talisation. This should also be linked to other initiatives,
such as the European Innovation Council, European
Strategic Cluster Partnerships and INNOSUP (Executive
Agency for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises [EASME],
2019; European Commission, 2019a).
• A more targeted funding allocation would create further
synergies: cities with high concentrations of talent and
low levels of investment offer an opportunity for invest-
ments. Locations with low investments offer both
untapped returns and an opportunity to boost less-pros-
perous regions of Europe by linking them to other clus-
ters for greater scale and scope.
• Clusters could be further linked and their synergies with
the wider economy strengthened through public procure-
ment for innovation (PPI). For emerging clusters, pre-com-
mercial versions of PPI can help to coordinate across
sectors in mobilising resources and selecting technologies.
• While major institutes like Fraunhofer and others working
at the interface of basic research and its applications
operate laboratories and facilities in several countries, too
many of Europe’s leading universities are far behind in
their capacity to create spin-offs and start-up companies
across borders. Horizon Europe could have a programme
targeted at smart clustering and market-making by uni-
versities and similar research institutions, comparable to
INNOSUP, but explicitly focused on research institutions.
This funding should be focused on increasing university
spin-offs (Hunady et al., 2019).
Conditions
EU member states differ markedly in innovation perfor-
mance. Efforts to overcome fragmentation have mostly
failed at the national level (Renda, 2011), and research has
shown (Crescenzi and Rodrıguez-Pose, 2017) that successful
innovation clusters are typically highly concentrated region-
ally, at least initially. A pre-requisite for the success of the
measures proposed here is the political willingness to create
European champions even if the benefits do not accrue to
all member states, let alone regions within them. Regional
differences are likely to remain and even sharpen, but
should be addressed by other policies. Another condition is
a serious review of previous and existing innovation policies,
especially in terms of their scaling and scoping record, with
an overall streamlining of policies and measures in mind.
Given that this is an already crowded field, institutional iner-
tia and resistance to change may create barriers. If Europe
wants to lead, it has to make way for the new. But care is
needed: the public sector is not adept at ‘picking-winners’.
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Feasibility
Given that many elements are in place (e.g., InvestEU, lead
institutions, emerging clusters, INNOSUP) the feasibility of
the proposal and the measures depends on finding poten-
tial champion clusters early on to create a momentum.
Demonstrating that scale and scope conditions can be
achieved through smart policies will be key to its accep-
tance. Other aspects will take longer and require regulatory
action, for example, creating adequate corporate legal forms
for smart clusters or modernising bankruptcy laws in mem-
ber states.
Benefits
For the EU, the benefits are ultimately higher growth and
better market positioning in critical fields of research and
the future economy, such as AI, biotechnology, mobility,
health care or (in the light of the political priorities of the
incoming European Commission) the environment. Ulti-
mately, the attractiveness of the EU as a global leader of
innovation in critical fields will enhance its power interna-
tionally. This is especially so in the face of China’s fast rise
in AI and biotechnology, and the protectionist policies of
the United States. In this sense, the measure serves two
related objectives: the future prosperity of Europe and its
capacity to project power. There are challenges such as
mobilising political will, overcoming inertia and securing
appropriate budgets, but the ultimate success smart clusters
and new markets of the future can bring to Europe may be
well worth the price.
A modernised competition policy
Proposal
While a robust competition policy is fundamental to the sin-
gle market, global competition may need a more nuanced
approach, allowing strategic mergers to create globally com-
petitive champions, a fresh look at the role of public pro-
curement, and to restrict the acquisition and control of
European assets by external corporations.
Rationale
New issues for competition policy have to be confronted,
especially in the digital economy. For example, the value of
personal data is not reflected in the turnover thresholds
applicable to control of mergers, giving rise to questions
concerning the applicability of these thresholds for public
intervention. In addition, it is open to question whether EU
competition policy pays enough attention to the global mar-
ket place and the future ability of European companies to
take on competitors from the US and, increasingly, China.
For example, Chinese railway giant CRRC’s global market
share is already 30 per cent, and its revenue is greater than
Siemens, Alstom and Bombardier combined (Zhu, 2019).
Although its internationalisation is limited so far, this is
expected to change in the future. In this context, the pro-
posed merger of Siemens and Alstom could have been
assessed not in the context of the European market alone,
but with the merged company’s global competitiveness in
mind. This understanding has also recently been endorsed
by the governments of France and Germany (Federal Min-
istry for Economic Affairs and Energy and Ministry for the
Economy and Finance, 2019).
WhatsApp is another example pointing to a need for a
more proactive and modernised competition policy: Face-
book bought the messaging service for $19bn in 2014. Since
then, the service has become the most popular messenger
with 1.6bn monthly active users. Together with Facebook’s
own messenger, the second most popular platform, both
services reach 2.9bn monthly active users (Clement, 2019).
One company is basically dominating the instant messaging
market. The same is true for Google, which is used for 92
per cent of all internet searches globally, and has its mobile
operating system installed on 76 per cent of all devices
worldwide (Grimaldi and Kendall, 2019).
As noted above in relation to new technologies, the
strategic role of public procurement has to be recognised.
In both the US and China, the connections between public
spending (and not just on defence) and the development of
major technologies has been crucial.
Measures
Current competition policy frameworks need to be reformed to
adapt to new indicators beyond turnover andmarket concentra-
tion. Antitrust authorities need to deepen their understanding
of technology and implement departments to provide advice
on increasingly complex technological matters (Cremer et al.,
2019). Recalling the breakup of telecoms monopolies in the
20th century, further consolidation of ‘big tech’ companies,
namely, the ‘FAANGs’ (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and
Google), should be investigated and, where there is excessive
market power, restricted. Such acquisitions are prone to impair
innovation and tend to result in de factomonopolies.
As a new European Commission takes shape, the clusters
of directorates-general could be reconfigured to bring com-
petition, industrial policy and trade closer together. As part
of this, a review of how public procurement is regulated
should be undertaken.
Conditions
There is an evident tension between the pro-competitive
ethos of EU competition policy, with its emphasis on assur-
ing a level-playing field for the single market, and the strate-
gic aim of promoting European companies globally. A
political challenge is the lack of consensus across member
states (Verhofstadt, 2019) on how to reconcile these objec-
tives. A sectoral approach, rather than an all-encompassing
competition policy could be one means of easing the ten-
sions (Petropoulos, 2019).
Feasibility
There are few direct budgetary implications, but for this
approach to accentuate Europe’s sharp power on the inter-
national stage, long-standing differences in national
approaches to competition will have to be managed. Inward
investment and the means by which companies exploiting
emerging technologies are regulated are likely to be key
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battle-grounds. It will need potentially awkward compro-
mises and could provoke clashes with the US or disputes at
the World Trade Organisation, especially if the new regula-
tory regime is perceived as an instrument of retaliation (Pet-
ropoulos, 2019).
Nevertheless, within Europe, there is evidence of a willing-
ness to rethink, as the Franco-German proposal demon-
strates. Among the most obvious areas to target are those
at the interface between emerging technologies and both
process and product innovation, alongside those where con-
ventional boundaries (notably between industry and ser-
vices) are unhelpful. In the information and creative sectors,
for example, the user and the client paying the supplier are
not the same entity, potentially altering the basis for compe-
tition and, by implication, possible regulatory interventions.
Users of search engines, for example, do not part with cash
for the service, but may ‘pay’ indirectly by supplying data.
Benefits
By aligning competition and industrial strategy more closely,
Europe can bridge the gap between internal and external
influences on economic development. The ability to exercise
sharp power derives in part from nurturing a well-perform-
ing economy. China’s state-owned or state-supported com-
panies are a clear example in this respect. A competition
policy configured to boost innovative sectors and to avoid
undue loss of control to foreign interests will reinforce Eur-
ope’s economic weight and ability to shape international
norms. It will need potentially awkward compromises at glo-
bal level to devise new regulatory models, but there is an
opportunity for Europe to lead.
Digital development initiative
Proposal
To establish an EU-wide digital development initiative (DDI),
comparable to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), that
simultaneously boosts member states’ digital capacities and
enhances digital connections with neighbouring global
regions.
Rationale
In addition to land and sea routes and facilities connecting
East and South Asia to Europe, Africa and beyond, China’s
Belt and Road Initiative includes the so-called digital Silk
Road. A European counter-initiative is needed to provide an
alternative to the Chinese one, as freeing countries from this
influence will prove itself to be a great challenge. Although
few details have been released so far, the BRI project
encompasses quantum computing, nanotechnology, artificial
intelligence, big data and cloud storage (The Economist,
2018). The initiative has contributed an estimated $79bn to
projects around the world (Prasso, 2019), although figures
are contested. In contrast, the Mercator Institute for China
Studies (MERICS) identifies investments of at least $17bn
related to digital silk road projects since 2013 (Eder et al.,
2019). The initiative enables China to reinforce its leading
position globally as an operating supplier of digital
infrastructure. In some areas, it has already made substantial
progress. In the realm of 5G technology, for example, Chi-
nese companies currently own 36 per cent of all patents
worldwide. Huawei had a global market share of 24.4 per
cent in 2017, making it the leading network equipment pro-
vider, ahead of Cisco (18.4% per cent) and Nokia (14.2 per
cent) (Rahn, 2019).
A European alternative has the potential to allay a num-
ber of concerns around the BRI and to facilitate the EU,
rather than China, becoming a standard setter, including on
privacy and cybersecurity issues. There is, too, an opportu-
nity to use DDI as part of EU development and neighbour-
hood policies. In defensive terms, with China having
become the leading supplier of hardware and certain types
of software, DDI can help to mitigate fears about security
vulnerabilities (Shabaz, 2018) – exemplified in the recent dis-
putes about Huawei hardware.
Digital infrastructure is crucial for further development
and sustained competitiveness of Europe’s economy, but a
shortfall in the required investment has left European com-
panies increasingly vulnerable to competition from China
and the US (Heymann and K€orner, 2018). Even industries in
which European companies are in a leading position, such
as robotics and automation, might be vulnerable to foreign
competitors.
Measures
Advancing the DDI will require a mix of financial resources
and legal initiatives, including:
• Public and private investment to enhance Europe’s digital
infrastructure, while also increasing individual privacy pro-
tection.
• National and Europe-wide legal frameworks for the
telecommunications sector that stimulate investments in
competitive high-speed internet infrastructure. Public
investments should be limited to areas the private sector
cannot currently justify, such as gigabit-capable technolo-
gies (Heymann and K€orner, 2018). Additional incentives
should be considered for rural areas, where telecommuni-
cations companies are otherwise unable to operate prof-
itably.
• A strategic assessment has to be conducted to identify
ways for the DDI to contribute to infrastructure develop-
ments in neighbouring countries, not least regions with
extensive Chinese operations.
• To extend the initiative’s reach to third countries, sub-
stantial financial resources will be needed: here a link to
EU international development policy would be appropri-
ate.
Conditions
The credibility of an EU-wide, and potentially beyond, rollout
of the DDI is impaired by the slow and often insufficient
progress of providing broadband access within the EU. A
recent report blames regulatory and economic reasons for
the slow progress with digital infrastructure improvements
(Heymann and K€orner, 2018).
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The EU’s own strategic goals are already at risk. As the
European Court of Auditors recently found, not all the tar-
gets in the Europe 2020 strategy will be met: rural areas
remain less connected than cities and the availability of
ultra-fast broadband (speed higher than 100 Mbps) is ‘signif-
icantly behind target’ (European Court of Auditors, 2018).
Feasibility
Progress will require agreement on standards and the regu-
latory toolkit, and will be difficult to achieve rapidly. The bal-
ance between private and public funding will also be
contentious. The European Commission estimates the costs
at around €515 billion to achieve the goal of a ‘gigabit soci-
ety’ by 2025, with 5G coverage for all urban areas and along
major transportation paths, as well as 100Mbps connectivity
for all households (European Commission, 2016a, 2016b).
The Commission further estimates a cumulative private sec-
tor investment by telecommunication operators of €360 bil-
lion by 2025, leaving a gap of €155 billion. Even with
expected synergies which lower the investments needed,
European level financial resources remain insufficient to fill
this gap, making increased private and national public
investments necessary (European Commission, 2016a). This
gap is even larger if the funding necessary for infrastructure
development in third countries is included. If the EU wants
to become a credible actor with respect to providing digital
infrastructure, achieving the gigabit society is a necessity.
This initiative is likely to be challenging, but the potential
rewards are considerable.
Benefits
The DDI can significantly enhance the EU’s soft power
through establishing the gigabit society which is an aspira-
tion for many countries. Second, pushing back on Chinese
attempts to influence neighbouring countries through its
BRI is a way to insulate Europe against Chinese sharp power
– European companies providing digital hardware and ser-
vices will in return strengthen Europe’s exercise of sharp
power.
Erasmus global
Proposal
To expand the strategic reach of Erasmus programmes to
become ‘Erasmus Global’.
Rationale
The Erasmus+ programme aims at supporting countries to
‘use the potential of Europe’s talent and social assets’ (Euro-
pean Commission, 2019c). In the EU’s 2021–27 budgetary
round (the multi-annual financial framework), the Commis-
sion has proposed doubling the programme’s allocation
from €14.7bn to €30bn, with the intention of tripling the
number of beneficiaries to 12 million (European Commis-
sion, 2018b). Programme countries – the EU28 as well as
North Macedonia, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, Serbia and
Turkey – are eligible for the full spectrum of Erasmus+
actions.
Other partner countries are subject to restrictive condi-
tions and, in many, the programme reaches relatively few
beneficiaries, although the budget for EU-Africa exchanges
amounts to 14.5 per cent of the programme’s entire budget.
There is a double rationale for boosting Erasmus outside its
main areas of eligibility. First, Erasmus and its successor pro-
gramme (Erasmus+) are unparalleled in their success. To
boost the EU’s soft power potential, Erasmus+ should
increase its reach and develop into ‘Erasmus Global’ to rea-
lise significant strategic gains. Second, it can strengthen Eur-
ope in the global battle to attract mobile skilled workers, by
show-casing the continent’s attractiveness.
Measures
While Erasmus Global, as its name suggests, should poten-
tially have global reach, the EU should target regions and
countries strategically, and employ resources accordingly,
both financially and thematically. The immediate neighbour-
hood of Europe, from Russia to the MENA region, should
rank high on the list, but the United States and China, as
main competitor countries, should not be neglected. Beyond
that Africa and Latin America could come into focus, also to
counter Chinese advances in the context of the Belt and
Road Initiative.
Depending on the country, Erasmus Global can consist of
four streams – academic/ science, professional/ vocational,
arts and culture as well as innovators and entrepreneurs –
in order to attract foreign brain capital. The exchange pro-
grammes (staff and students) need to be accompanied by
thematic programmes, which educate participants about the
EU and its role in the world, as well as to foster discussion
about European values.
An integral part should be an alumni network to help sus-
tain a personal connection between alumni and the pro-
gramme – similar to the Fulbright alumni programme. This
alumni network should be strategically managed and
resourced to make sure that European interests are sup-
ported locally as well as regionally.
Conditions
The EU has a strong base on which to build, given the
attractiveness of its universities and the success of the ERAS-
MUS Programme to date. But Europe must also recognise
the increasingly competitive challenges its university sector
faces from around the world. Fortunately, the EU has taken
steps to further strengthen its infrastructure and skills by
funding a European university alliance, which intends to
strengthen the mobility of students and staff and increase
the competitiveness of European higher education (O’Malley,
2019). Erasmus Global will benefit from this increased attrac-
tiveness of European universities. A key challenge will be to
secure additional funding for capitalising strategically on the
growing alumni base to build a network of pro-Europeans
outside the EU.
Feasibility
The prospects for realising this objective depend mostly on
the political will to support the EU taking on a stronger role
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in this area. While such a ‘soft power’ initiative is typically
less controversial than ‘hard’ or ‘sharp’ power alternatives, it
requires the allocation of significant additional resources, it
may be seen as intruding on long-established national pro-
grammes, and there may be international security or intelli-
gence sensitivities. In the US, for example, universities are
increasingly cautious about Chinese students, who may act
for their government as an intelligence tool. A directive
issued by the Chinese Government in 2016, which intends
to ‘harness the patriotic capabilities of overseas students’,
supports this notion (Bislev, 2017).
That said, our respondents in the USA and Asia viewed
ERASMUS Global favourably. It was seen as a relatively low-
cost/high benefit endeavour, offering long-term – albeit
often indirect – benefits. As one put it, ‘Europe has a histori-
cal base on which to build and worldwide admiration for its
cultural products and influence’. Yet, the strategic utility of
the proposal was questioned by some of our Asian inter-
locutors, with sceptics citing Japan-South Korea tensions
and another Japan’s ‘JET’ English-language programme as
examples of the limits to cultural schemes of ‘soft power’.
Others emphasised the barriers posed by university bureau-
cracies in Asia.
Benefits
Strengthening the global reach of the Erasmus Programme
offers the EU an effective platform for exerting its socio-cul-
tural influence via a growing and managed alumni network,
with impacts on political attitudes and understanding, while
producing linked economic gains. It allows the EU to
strengthen its human capital in key areas of the economy;
and to spread its own understanding of teaching and
research to other parts of the world.
Culture Europe
Proposal
To develop Culture Europe, a new agency, designed to
exploit cultural assets more strategically and effectively, and
to project European values more widely and vigorously as a
means of enhancing Europe’s overall soft power and stand-
ing in the world.
Rationale
European values, the diversity and richness of Europe’s cul-
tural heritage, and its creativity and artistic excellence have
long had a powerful global influence. However, individual
member states dominate external cultural policy, and
advance mostly national rather than common European
interests abroad, even though there have been moves
toward greater collaboration in recent years. Nonetheless,
European cultural policy remains insufficiently coherent and
lacks a common voice. In short, Europe’s unparalleled cul-
tural assets, and, therefore, its soft power potential, are
under-exploited.
While cultural policy is considered to be an important
European means of increasing the EU’s global visibility and
influence (Triandafyllidou and Sz}ucs, 2017), there is
nonetheless a serious mismatch between Europe’s aspira-
tions as a world power and how it deploys soft power
assets. For De Vries (2019), cultural diplomacy is the missing
link in Europe’s foreign policy. This contrasts notably with
the more than 500 Confucius Institutes which, according to
the Financial Times report from 1 November 2019, can exert
an unwarranted influence on host university curricula. The
EU’s EUNIC (European National Institutes for Culture) initia-
tive has many virtues, but cannot overcome this mismatch.
More proactive steps and institutional innovation are called
for.
Measures
The core of this proposal is to establish a new entity, Cul-
ture Europe, with the following objectives:
• boosting Europe’s values and cultural assets outside the
EU;
• cooperating with national cultural agencies to leverage
both national and EU-wide interests;
• seeking greater cultural influence and advancing an
understanding of central EU positions and interests in key
regions around the world;
• creating greater awareness about Europe and what it
stands for by establishing a global media presence and
outreach, including through social media; and
• linking cultural policy to other policy fields, in particular
foreign policy, but also in the fields of education, science,
and trade.
Culture Europe would build on the EUNIC network, organ-
ised in many countries across the globe, which acts as a
‘partner of the European Commission and other European
institutions, in defining and implementing European cultural
policy’ (European National Institutes for Culture [EUNIC], n.d.).
Unlike EUNIC, however, Culture Europe would not be a
voluntary association, and unlike a directorate general, it
would be a separate, arm’s length agency, accountable to
the European Parliament. It would have an annual budget
to match the combined budget of the 36 national cultural
agencies to achieve a relevant scale, and a strategic rapid
reaction fund to respond quickly when European values are
challenged or cultural assets are in jeopardy. Culture Europe
would have a physical presence in all countries and regions
of strategic importance to the EU, and work closely with the
various national culture agencies. The relationship between
Culture Europe and the national agencies would be based
on subsidiarity and resource parity. Both set common strate-
gic goals, decide on priorities and areas of joined activities.
Conditions
The mandate and the resources of Culture Europe have to
be such that it can effectively and efficiently advance Eur-
ope’s soft power, while not taking away from the aspirations
and activities of member states. Achieving this balance
between Culture Europe and existing culture agencies will be
a critical condition. EUNIC already operates various pro-
grammes around the world, and with added administrative
and monetary resources through Culture Europe, a more
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coordinated and impactful strategy could be established to
enhance cooperation between national culture agencies and
other stakeholders outside the EU. A critical condition, there-
fore, is a common understanding among member states
that Culture Europe would fill a serious gap in Europe’s soft
power capabilities and enhance the overall positions of
national cultural agencies.
Feasibility
The enhancement of Europe’s soft power, targeted strategi-
cally to key regions of interest, seems feasible given the
political will of member states to pool national and EU
resources, and to entrust a dedicated agency to take the
lead when needed in close cooperation with national agen-
cies. In many ways, Culture Europe can be regarded as the
proverbial ‘low hanging fruit’, that is, a step to implement
quickly. Possibly forceful objections could come from mem-
ber states fearing a strategic pooling of resources and new,
strong mandates for Culture Europe could threaten their
own national interests.
Benefits
European culture is more than the sum of the various
national cultures. Thus, in a world where other values and
cultural systems increasingly challenge those of Europe, a
more strategic, proactive and forceful approach is required.
Culture Europe as a modern and cost-effective way to
advance Europe’s voice and influence in strategic countries
and regions is the appropriate response to counter influ-
ence-seeking by the likes of China and Russia, and fills the
void for defending and advancing Western values left by an
isolationist United States. The agency would significantly
add to the coherence of Europe’s external policies, and
strengthen the complementarity between the EU level and
member states. External cultural policy can add value to
other areas as well, be they trade, science or the media.
Implications and recommendations
Europe is generally seen as ‘punching beneath its weight.’
Too often, it falls short of its own ambitions, takes third
place behind the US and China in international affairs, and
frequently lacks strategic ambitions. As a result, Europe risks
falling behind these other global powers. To explore options
on how to counteract this tendency, we developed a num-
ber of proposals for enhancing Europe’s soft and sharp
power. While each measure can certainly stand on its own
merits, combining them to create synergies will add to their
overall effectiveness and impact:
• Internationalisation of the euro and Sanctions. Enhancing
the euro’s role as a global reserve currency is an impor-
tant building block for an effective sanctions repertoire.
As the US is using the dollar’s global importance to
strong-arm countries into compliance, the EU could simi-
larly use the euro to increase the bite of its sanctions.
Triggering sanctions could involve the European data rat-
ing agency: if ratings for privacy are below a certain
threshold, companies could be denied access to Euro-
pean markets or become subjects to fines.
• Erasmus Global, Smart Clusters, and Culture Europe. The
alumni network of Erasmus Global can be employed in
smart innovation clusters, thereby effectively serving as a
recruiting tool which funnels talent into relevant projects
and creates opportunities to keep foreign brain capital in
Europe. Alumni activities could also be supported by Cul-
ture Europe by providing opportunities for exchange and
local outreach.
• Digital Development Initiative, Smart Clustering. The DDI
could build on the smart clustering proposal by creating
digital hubs alongside a growing digital infrastructure,
funded by InvestEU. This would also address criticism
directed at the Juncker Plan’s lack of geographical diver-
sity (European Court of Auditors, 2019), as the DDI
intends to establish infrastructure across the EU. As the
DDI aims to promote European standards beyond EU bor-
ders, the link could counteract China’s advances in digital
authoritarianism (Shabaz, 2018).
Irrespective of synergies that can be achieved by combin-
ing measures, there are several implications that have come
up repeatedly and strongly in both the back-casting exercise
and the validations. If, by 2030, Europe wants to become a
self-confident and united market power, offering a demo-
cratic and socially inclusive alternative globally, with eco-
nomic growth, open trade and a rule-based, multilateral
order, these implications offer crucial lessons.
First, despite significant advances in European coordination
and integration, Europe continues to be fragmented, and the
sum of its parts (member states) appear less than the concord
needed for enhancing its sharp and soft power, and indeed
what is needed to implement the measures suggested here.
This fragmentation applies both internally, but critically also
to the way Europe is perceived by China and the United
States, or indeed Russia. Fragmentation equals weakness, and
reducing it in key policy fields should be a priority for the EU
institutions, as well as the member states. A related weakness
is the procrastination often visible in pursuing necessary
reforms or in solving problems at home. Without internal
cohesion, external power projection will struggle.
At some point, soft and sharp power advances become
ineffective without being backed up with sufficient hard
power. With NATO weakening, and with new security threats
in Europe’s neighbourhood and in cyber space arising, Europe
needs to review fundamentally how hard and sharp power
relate to each other. Europe needs to seek a better balance.
Recent initiatives like PESCO are useful first steps, but more is
needed to make the development of European hard power a
pressing matter for debate and policy action across relevant
EU institutions and all member states.
What is more, Europe is simply not strategic enough.
Geopolitically, especially compared to China, Europe seems
less focused on specific parts of the world, lacking even a
coherent approach to what the Americans think of as the
immediate ‘back-yard’, and timid in linking its strategic inter-
ests to economic interests and its values. In key policy fields,
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Europe is less clear about its role and less willing to act in
its own interest than the US. However, the success of the
GDPR and regulatory actions to curb the power of digital
near-monopolies like Facebook and Amazon have shown
that Europe can act assertively, and that it will be quickly
recognised globally as doing so.
This paper has identified some of the key impediments to
utilising the EU’s potential in its external relations. Such
potential is realised when governments forgo their auton-
omy (and weakness) for collective gains. This will enable the
EU to become more effective in meeting current public aspi-
rations on key policy agendas – such as climate change,
human rights; etc. – as signalled in the 2019 European elec-
tions, thereby overcoming the ‘capability-expectations gap’
(Hill, 1993). It will also place the EU in a more proactive
position in the face of current trends and future threats. It is
an agenda for the EU’s own transformation as an external
actor.
Indeed, in terms of sharp power, we suggest that Europe
needs to punch above its weight when necessary, and when
called for strategically. This more ‘assertive Europe’ should
be balanced by the ‘ethical Europe’ of its soft power. The
measures proposed here offer ways and means of achieving
this vision.
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the London School of Economics and Political Science. The authors of this
report would like to particularly thank the more than 40 experts from aca-
demia and policy located in Europe, the US, and Asia for their helpful
input and comments on the findings. The final evaluation of this report
took place at the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC), the European
Commission’s in-house think tank in Brussels. The authors thank Pawel
Swieboda, deputy head of the EPSC and Dahrendorf Forum Committee
member, for his ongoing support.
1. Examples of strong signals are major events like the 2016 referen-
dum in United Kingdom on EU membership or the election of Don-
ald Trump in the same year. Examples of weak signals are: when in
the 1990/2000s many oil corporations started shale gas explorations,
at that time no one anticipated how pronounced an effect this
would eventually have on global hydrocarbon markets; sentiments of
being ill-treated by the West coming out of Russia during the 1990s,
leading to Putin’s rise as autocrat; declining membership in religious
institutions (which already started in the 1970s) but are now chang-
ing the social fabric of European societies.
2. The accession criteria, or Copenhagen criteria are the essential condi-
tions all candidate countries must satisfy to become a member state.
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/
accession-criteria_en
3. Hybrid warfare is understood as a combination of military and non-
military operations, intended to “blur the lines between war and
peace, and attempt to sow doubt in the minds of target populations”
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 2019). Amongst military
forces, hybrid warfare includes disinformation operations, cyber-at-
tacks as well as economic coercion.
4. While climate change might have been thought of as another obvi-
ous area, it is already accepted as being an area in which Europe
leads globally.
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